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ABSTRACT
Strategic advantage through information technology is a popular theme, but the extent of research
support is sporadic, minimal, and unsystematic. This paper reports some preliminary results of a quasi-
experimental study on the role of dedicated electronic integration (between an insurance carrier and its
independent agents in the Property and Casualty market) in providing strategic benefits to this carrier.
The results indicate that the agents that are electronically interfaced with the carrier report
improvements in a set of four performance factors in the expected direction (six months after system
installation) but statistically different from a matched set of non-interfaced agents (based on size, state,
and location category) only in terms of increases in efficiency (number of policies) but not in terms of
effectiveness (increase in financial performance indices). Further, within the sample of electronically-
interfaced agents, over a one-year period after integration, the differential performance positions
continue for this factor, raising the possibility of learning effects. Some explanations, extensions and
research implications are outlined.
1. INTRODUCTION changing market characteristics (Bakos 1987; Malone,
Yates and Benjamin 1987). There is a glaring lack of
The subject of information technology and its potential for empirical research studies that particularly isolate the
strategic advantage has gained currency in recent years. effects, if any, of such systems on business performance.
The evolving literature is largely dominated by conceptual Indeed, much of the support is based on anecdotes,
frameworks (McFarlan 1984; Porter and Millar 1985; personal opinions and experiences rather than systematic
Wiseman 1985) and detailed case studies on popular research studies. Thus, a formal, empirical assessment of
examples and applications such as McKesson's Economost the role and benefits of electronic integration appears
system (Clemons and Row 1988), American Airlines' necessary and timely.
SABRE reservation systems (Copeland and McKenney
1988) or American Hospital Supply's ASAP system Towards this end, this paper discusses the results of a
(Harvard Business School Case 1985, 1988). A major quasi-experimental study on the effects of electronic
reason for the consideration of IT-based applications as integration in the insurance industry, with a particular
potential sources of strategic advantage lies in the capabili- focus on the Property and Casualty (P&C) business. The
ty for electronic integration among a set of firms that uniqueness of this study lies in
could potentially change the basis of competition in an
industry (Barrett and Konsynski 1982; Cash and Konsynski (a) its quasi-experimental design with an alien'mental
1984; Johnston and Vitale 1988). The term "electronic sample of independent insurance agents that are
integration: as used here involves the creation of a electronically interfaced (with a dedicated system) and
business network among selected firms that centrally a matcheg control sample (based on size, state,
exploit the capabilities offered by interorganizational location category) of agents that are not electronically
(information) systems (IOS). interfaced with this particular insurance carrier; and
While the role and benefits of interorganizational systems (b) the use of objective, longitudinal performance data on
have achieved the status of conventional wisdom, the extent these agents from the carrier's records that enables
of research support for arguing their importance is rather one to isolate the specific effects of electronic integra-
limited. The current literature is restricted to discussions tion.
of the nature and levels of IOS (Barrett and Konsynski
1982), descnptive and nonizative frameworks for manag- Thus, the study offers an opportunity to systematically test
ers to assess the role of IOS in their organizational an implicitly-accepted, but largely-untested proposition on
contexts (Cash and Konsynski 1984; Johnston and Vitale the benefits of electronic integration. The paper is divided
1988) and theoretical discussions of the role of IOS in into four sections. The next section discusses the theoreti-
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cal background for the study, and the particular character- booked through the SABRE system was much higher for
istics of the P&C market, leading to the formulation of the American Airlines' flights than for any other airline whose
research hypothesis. The third section discusses the schedules were also displayed on the system.
research design, data and analysis. The fourth section
presents the results and discusses the implications. While there appears to be strong face validity to the results
reported in these case studies, from a research point of
view they need to be supplemented using more formal
2. BACKGROUND: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS criteria of social science research. For this purpose, we
AND RESEARCH SETTING use the following set of six criteria provided by Terpstra
(1981) in his assessment of research studies on organiza-
2.1 Electronic Integration and Strategic Advantage tion development effects: the presence of a probability
sample, an adequate sample size for analysis, the use of a
In this research stream, terms like IOS, EDI (electronic control group, random selection for treatment, pre- and
data interchange), and VAP (value-added partnerships) post-tests, and the use of significance levels for assessing
have often been used synonymously. Our view of "elec- the effects of treatment. For a systematic evaluation of
tronic integration" involves (a) arrangements and transac- electronic integration effects, these criteria need to be
tions in a business network that is fundamentally enabled satisfied.
by electronic interfacing, i.e., multi-organization informa-
tion systems, and (b) firms in the business network that are
independent along some dimensions (i.e., they are not Iligh *
entirely dependent) such that it is distinguished from  FE\\vertical, quasi-integration (Blois 1972). In other words, \\AS \electronic integration refers to strategies adopted by the \I \
different firms in a business network Uarillo 1988) that is ,  /L' 0
T \centrally defined using one or more electronic interfaces. \\Y 1
Thus, this conceptualization builds on the deployment of *#25& I . c,;/
IOS but has a distinct business orientation; similarly,  NS\\electronic integration goes beyond the adoption of EDI DATA
Models \ , TR, \ \standards for computer-to-computer communication. INTEGRITY
Further, our view of IT-enabled strategic advantage relates Field Experimeot (3) 0  Nl ,
to the "advantage that accrues to the focal organization Fickl Saudies (2)  \  
using a specific IT-application that cannot be obtained .
through other mechanisms." ,Case Research (l} \
Sulveys i ' SCIENCE
r
Assessment of Evidence. As noted earlier, the extent of 'Stories' NON-SCIENCE(Popular Prcss)
support for the benefits of electronic integration is sparse. (4)
The American Hospital Supply Corporation's (AHSC, now Personal
Opinions MA/LegendsBaxter Travenol) ASAP System is a classic, overworked r1 Highillustration in this area. Although no systematic assessment CURRENCY
of its effects is available, by 1984 over 4,500 customers
were linked through this system which carried over 100,000 KEY
products. Further, AHSC increased its sales by an average (1) Cop'Ind and M¢Kinney (1988). C.se $1'dics on AHSC-ASAP: AlinaGemini, ctc.
of thirteen percent per year during the period 1978 to 1983. (2) Clc:nonsand Row (1988)
(3) nis studyA typical hospital order through this system averaged 5.8 (4) Business Week, Fortune. MIS Week. etc.
items as compared to an industry average of 1.7 items
(Business Week 1980). Baxter executives and industry Figure 1. Strategic Effects of Electronic Integration
observers credit the system for the success of the company An Assessment of Research Efforts (based on Bonoma [1985])
in the competitive hospital supplies marketplace. In
contrast, Clemons and Row (1988) provide a more detailed
analysis of McKesson's Economost system. According to Further following Bonoma (1985) we position the litera-
them, since the system was first introduced nationally in ture on 2he effects of electronic integration in terms of two
1975, McKesson's drug sales have grown from $922 million dimensions: cuirency (external validity) and data
to $4.8 billion, an increase of 422 percent, while its integnky (reliability) in Figure 1. A major observation
from Figure 1 is that much of the available evidence isoperating expenses have only gone up by 86 percent;
based on anecdotes (discussions in the popular businessMcKesson also sizably reduced the number of personnel
press), personal opinions, and a few selected detailed case-in order entry and sales. Similarly, airlines reservation
systems have been studied in detail (e.g., Copeland and studies. This preponderance of case studies is not only
McKenney 1988). Although exact data are not available, inevitable in the initial stages of a particular researchstream, but is also necessary for framing the criticalit is widely acknowledged that the proportion of tickets
research questions. However, as the stream matures, it is
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necessary to go beyond these designs for formalized, systems, and exclusive agencies. Third, there is an in-
deductive assessments of propositions on the role and creasing incidence of the installation of agency automation
benefits of electronic integration. Specifically, field systems ("back-office" automation), which require larger
experiments and field studies (Figure 1) seem worthwhile business volumes with the resulting scale economies to be
and attractive now. efficient. Finally, electronic integration between insurance
carriers and independent agents is another force that has
This study is explicitly predicated on the need to design been changing the competitive characteristics of the
and conduct a field experiment on the effects of electronic marketplace. A recent survey estimated that 28 percent of
integration and incorporates five of the six criteria of all independent agents were integrated with at least one
Terpstra (1981) into its design. insurance carrier (d'Adolf 1987, p. 28).
Within the P&C market, personal lines are characterized
by increasing vertical integration because of their relatively
2.2 The Property and Casualty Insurance Market standardized and regulated products. Insurance products
of personal lines have been prime targets of large insur
The US insurance industry divides broadly into the Life ance carriers for obtaining efficiencies from high volume
and Health and the Property and Casualty (P&C) markets, processing as evidenced by a high degree of computeriza-
each with its distinctive set of products and channels of tion in their operations. In contrast, commercial lines are
distribution. P&C insurance offers protection against such less regulated, more complex, and thus are being auto-
risks as fire, theft, accident and general liability. The P&C mated in terms of computerized policy processing only
market further breaks out into personal and commercial recently. It is not coincidental that expert systems, which
lines, the former covering individuals (automobile and have seen a surge of development of late, are beginning to
homeowner insurance for example) and the latter indem- have an integral role in the automation of commercial
nifying business policy holders against general liability and lines. This study focuses on the specific effects of automa-
workers' compensation. The industrygenerated about $200 tion of the commercial lines.
billion in premiums in 1988 (based on Standard and Poor
industry surveys).
The P&C insurance market, particularly its commercial 2.3 The Nature of Electronic Integration
lines, relies mainly on independent agents for distribution
of its products to the customer, unlike the Life and Health Industry standards for electronic policy information
Companies which typically employ large sales forces. transfer between the carrier and insurance agents have
Independent agents are compensated on commission terms been set by the industry organization, ACORD. In 1983,
and they retain the rights to their policies and accounts, the Insurance Value Added Networks (IVANS) was
even if their relationship with the insurance carrier issuing established. While the agents seem favorably disposed to
the policy is terminated. Thus, the independent agent is the use of a common standard, some carriers are less
entitled to continue receiving commissions on unexpired enthusiastic about adopting a common standard as they
policies, although the agent may sell the renewal rights on believe that a "true interface" between the agent and all the
the policy (Stern and El-Ansary 1977). relevant carriers would make the market more price-
competitive than before. This is because the transaction
The P&C market is composed of over 3,600 insurance cost of accessing and evaluating alternate quotes is drama-
carriers since there are few barriers to entry. This level of tically reduced, thereby improving the market positions of
fragmentation makes for highly competitive conditions and the agents relative to the carriers. Indeed, in in the
intense price-based competition. Approximately 300 terminology of Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987), such
carriers have multiple offices (Frost and Sullivan 1984) and a move would have propelled the industry from a decen-
20 to 30 are major carriers accounting for about 50 percent tralized marketplace towards an electronic market due to
of revenues. The largest carrier accounted for about nine significant reductions in the "unit costs of coordination" of
percent in 1986 and the top four controlled only 21 the delivery of the insurance product.
percent, indicating relatively low market power in the
industry. To counter the move towards common, industry-wide
standards, some leading insurance carriers (such as Aetna,
Further, we are seeing a major transformation of the CIGNA, Travellers, St. Paul) have chosen to install
industry in recent years along several dimensions. One, systems with proprietary interface standards operated
there has been a reduction in the number of independent through private networks. This initiative stalls (albeit in a
agents by as much as 25 percent during the period 1980 to limited way) the movement towards predominantly price-
1986 (d'Adolf 1987, p. 27.) to around 42,000 due to the based competition, which might result from agents using
consolidation of agency operations. Two, there is a a common network to "instantaneously shop around" for
growing trend in forward integration by carriers through the best price (as enabled, for example, by the airline
mechanismssuchasdirect-writing, commissionedemployee reservation system).
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This research is focused exclusively at the level of one 2.4 The Expected Benefits of Electronic Integration
carrier that has installed such a system with its agents (who
may or may not be electronically interfaced with other The Underlying Theory. Following Malone, Yates and
carriers). Benjamin(1987),developments ininformationtechnologics
are expected to give rise to three sets of effects: (a)
electronic communication 4ect, reducing costs of
Electronic Integration and the Carrier's Business Stra- communication while expanding the reach (time and
tegy. Electronic integration with the agents is considered distance); (b) e/ectronic brokerage e#ect, increasing the
by this carrier to be a central element in its business number and quality of considerations of alternatives, and
strategy. The carrier's business strategy in the P&C decreasing the cost of transactions; and (c) electronic
market can be broadly described in terms of (a) reducing integration efects, increasing the degree of interdepen-
the number of agents to concentrate on a limited number dence between the set of participants involved in the
of high-potential agents (with significant share-of-business insurance delivery process. Had the insurance industry
with this carrier); (b) controlling loss ratios (which are adopted a common platform for integration (as in the
highly related to the share-of-business of the agent, i.e., the current state of airlines reservation systems), it would have
largest share carrier has the best loss-ratios); and (c) presumably resulted in all three effects being operative
creating product differentiation (through higher service leading to an electronic marketplace. However, such is not
levels). the case here. This situation is one of a small group of
carriers -- mainly the larger ones -- each with its own
This business strategy is supported by electronic integration network of agents (with the larger agents having multiple
by way of the installation of a commercial policy processing interfacing capabilities) expecting to realize benefits from
system at selected independent agents. The specific dedicated vertical information systems.
characteristics of the system are:
An additional argument is provided by Rotemberg and
(a) On-litte policy quotation, which enables the agent to Saloner (1989) in their discussion of cooperative advantage
obtain relevant information on a potential quote with versus competitive advantage through information techno-
relative ease and quickness compared to the traditional logy networks. The former arises when a firm goes along
means of paper-based communication with the carrier with a common standard instead of pushing its own
(typically between one and two weeks). More impor- proprietary standard. However, if a firm can successfully
tantly, the ease of information exchange implies that differentiate its network, then the competitive advantage
this carrier would at least be under active consider- gained from such a network may be greater than the
ation for channeling the business. cooperative advantage of standardization. Thus, this is a
central business strategy decision for the insurance carrier
(b) Multiple option flexibili(y, which enables the agent and, in the present setting, the carrier has decided to go
to explore alternative bundles of specifications at the with a dedicated system.
decentralized location on-line.
Thus, following Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987),
(c) Risk evaluation, which provides an efficient basis for Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), and Williamson (1975), our
evaluating the risk propensity of a prospective policy theory would predict that each carrier that deploys a
with the capability offered by the back-end expert network characterized by limited access (with the asso-
systems. ciated benefits of electronic communication and integration
for the connected agents) would benefit significantly in
(el) Policy issuance, which allows agents to initiate the terms of greater business volume and increased market
process of issuing a policy at remote carrier locations, share. This is because the classical forces favoring commo-
thereby increasing agents' control and reducing paper- ditization of the insurance product (in the electronic
handling. markets) are countered by IT-enabled differentiation
mechanisms operating within electronic hierarchies. The
(e) Endorsements, which allow greater autonomy and specific characteristic of electronic hierarchies here is
responsibility for post-issuance support (including provided bythe existence of linked databases and processes
minor modifications). (underwriting and the role of expert systems) between the
agents and the carriers.
(f) Chu'ins handling, which automates the steps involved
in settling claims, resulting in improved efficiency and
greater level of service. nvo Levels of Analysis. In the case of electronic integra-
tion involving two distinct types of organizations, namely
An additional feature of this specific deployment is that the the carrier (i.e., the deployer of the system) and the agent
system is installed at no cost to the agents as the carrier (i.e., where the system is deployed), it is important to
bears the entire expense of hardware, software, communi- differentiate the type and extent of strategic advantages to
cations and associated training. the two organizations. At the level of the agent, the
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specific benefits are as outlined above. Specifically, given (a) Cost Versus Benejit Approach, requiring a direct
that the agent is not required to share the system costs, the economic assessment of all costs associated with this
benefits are directly provided by any increases in efficiency initiative compared directly against actual realized
and an improved capability to service existing and potential benefits along a set of pre-specified performance
clients. These issues, including the costs to the system and criteria.
captivity impacts, are beyond the scope of the current
paper, which specifically focuses on the benefits accrued to (b) Benchmarking Approach, requiring an assessment
the carrier. ofperformance improvements for the interfaced agents
against a matched sample of agents that are not
For the carrier, who deployed the dedicated system and interfaced.
bore its costs and given the relative increase in the "ease
of doing business," the expectation is that more business The cost-benefit approach is complex for the following
would be channelized to this carrier than before. Specifi- reasons.
cally, if we argue that commercial insurance products are
becoming commodities with strong price-competition and a. The costs were incurred over a period of several years
fewer opportunities for true product differentiation, it over successive iterations of the system rendering a
appears that "information" (enhanced through specific direct cost versus benefit comparison somewhat
electronic interfacing) is a major dimension of differentia- difficult.
tion. Information-based differentiation is important for the
personal lines products because they are largely informa- b. Given the carrier's strategy of adopting a proprietary
tion-intensive, but commercial lines products have an system to create sources of firm-specific competitive
additional dimension of differentiability since they are advantage, some of the benefits are not directly
more knowledge-intensive. measurable in terms of short-term improvements in
performance.
There are interesting parallels with other cases. For
example, the ASAP system has reportedly channelized c. The system is conceived by the firm as a strategic
more business to American Hospital Supply due to ease of thrust involving several business lines over many years,
system use as well as its capability to assist in a variety of thus making any precise cost allocation for a given set
business transactions such as order-status, tracking, and so of business nearly impossible.
on. Similarly, as American Airlines received a greater
proportion of business based on the "display bias" on the d, A direct cost versus benefit assessment does not rule
screen, the expectation is that the focal, interfaced carrier out the possibility that agents could substitute other
would always be considered as a potential underwriter of business factors, for example better service and lower
a particular business (as long as it offers the product line). prices, to compensate for the lack of system function-
alitics such as instant information on policies.
Further, there is the expectation of increased business
volume from the agents resulting from an expansion of In cont4ast, the benchmarking approach has the following
their volume of operations. The efficiencies in information benefits.
processing through electronic integration would ensure that
the agent could service a larger account base than before. a. It controls for the temporal context of industry cycles
The assumption here is that the differential information given that both sets of agents are facing the same
processing capabilities (such as timeliness, accuracy, external conditions.
efficiency, and expert-system support) are critical differen-
tiators of the commercial insurance product. Thus, the b. It isolates the specific IT-based gains by using a
agent's capability -- to quote, issue, and underwrite policies matched sample.
specifically tailored to the customer requirements and
differentially from the competitors who are not electroni- c, It avoids arbitrariness in cost allocation and focuses on
cally interfaced -- is considerably enhanced. effects relative to a benchmarked sample.
Assessment of Effects of Electronic Integration. As noted Therefore, the effects are assessed from a goal-centered
before, this paper is focused at the level of the insurance perspective (Cameron and Whetten 1983) in terms of the
carrier. The approaches to assessment of effectiveness is specific set of benefits expected by the focal carrier. This
a thorny issue in organizational research (Cameron and set of expected benefits was created based on discussions
Whetten 1983), including IS research, which uses several with the company executives and it includes increases in
different constructs (e.g., Trice and Treacy 1989). There total written premium, number of policies in force, com-
are two dominant approaches to the assessment of ex- missions, and new business policies. Collectively, these
pected benefits for the carrier. represent the effectiveness construct for this study.
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2.5 Hypothesis however, we were fortunate to obtain a reasonable,
matched control group. This design controls for a major
The general hypothesis for the study is stated in a null set of threats to validity.
form (with an alternate form).
Ho: Electronic integration will have no effect on the 6 Months Electronic 6 Monthsperformance of the interfaced agents as compared with Before Integration Afterthe non-interfaced agents;
INTERFACED 11 X IlHalt:Electronic integration will have a positive effect on AGENTS
the performance of the agents that are electronically
interfaced as compared to those that are not inter- NON·INTERFACED *2 Kfaced. AGENIS
3. RESEARCH DESIGN X - Electronic Integration("treatment")
3.1 Design of Quasi-Experiment Ki - Perfolmance Assessment al 4 · 1-1,4
As mentioned above, the research design involved a quasi- Halt i 113 --Ll > ir,4 - 1[.
experimental study of the performance effects of electronic Ki K 2
integration in the commercial lines of the P&C market
HO : It3 -=-1Lt = ZA_ - lewith a particular focus on the electronic integration by one
Kl X 2major carrier. The essential characteristics of the design
involved five steps.
Figure 1 The Design of the Quasi-Experimental Study
I. Identification of a random sample of agents that
are electronically-interfaced with the carrier
(termed here as the "experimental" group). The integration with the agents began in 1985 and is still
continuing. For this research, in order to control for
II. Identification of a "matched set" of non-interfaced possible temporal effects (particularly sensitive in the
agents who are matched using three critical insurance industry which is susceptible to volatile cycles),
criteria: size (in terms of premium volume), the sample was restricted to those integrated in one
location category (metro, small city, suburban calendar year. Given our need for an adequate sample size
versus rural), and geographic category (state or for statistical analysis, we chose the year that recorded the
region). In other words, a corresponding agent in largest integrations, which was 1987. The sample size for
the same size category, in the same state, and in the two groups are interfaced group (i.e., treatment),
the same location category was selected. n = 85, and non-interfaced, n = 75.
III. Identification of the date of electronic integration.
This was the later of the two dates on which the 3.2 Data
two most significant commercial lines of business
were electronically interfaced, as identified by the Data on the four performance indicators were obtained
carrier for each agent. from the internal records of the insurance carrier. For
each agent, the performance levels were obtained for six
IV. Selection of a "performance effects window" six months prior to integration and for six months after the
months prior to interfacing and six monthst after integration. Given that all the data are obtained from the
interfacing. internal records, there are no compelling reasons to expect
differential measurement systems fur the two groups (oneV. Analysis of the performance effects of integration. of the common threats to validity in this type of design).
The measurement error, if any, is common to the two
The quasi-experimental design adopted for the research groups of agents.
needs some discussion. As shown in Figure 2, the design
adopted is the untreated control gioup design with Performance attributable to integration is assessed as the
pirtest and posttest (Cook and Campbell 1979). This is slope (in terms of differences) rather than as absolute
different from the pure experimental design version in,· levels, This is because the inherent differences in the
which the experimental subjects are assigned randomly performance levels before integration are corrected by
from a common population. We did not have the oppor- focusing on the changes in performance. Discussions with
tunity to influence the selection of agents to be interfaced; the managers of the carrier indicated that no other major
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confounding factors exist differentially across the two Accordingly, we evaluated the performance changes
groups. Thus, if performance differences are found for the (percent) over a period of one year after integration.
electronically-interfaced group in comparison to the control There was a significant percentage increase in the number
group, they can be attributed with confidence to electronic of policies issued among the interfaced group compared
integration. with the non-interfaced group (t-value: 2.04, p <.05). It is
important to recognize that while there is some possibility
The performance differences across the two groups are of confounding effects due to a one-year window, these are
assessed using t-tests. Since the data on percentage mitigated by the fact that the results are compared against
changes in performance appeared not to conform to a benchmarked sample of matched agents in the same
standard normal distributions, data on percentage changes time-period. So, in contrast to a posttest only design (even
in performance were rescaled using a natural log transfor- with a matched sample), the confounding effects are
mation. The values for skewness and kurtosis, which far considerably minimized. However, along the dimensions
exceeded the normal range in the original scale,, now of total premium and commissions, there were no diffe-
exhibited values within an acceptable range for normal rences.
distribution.
Thus, we speculate at this stage on the existence and
impact of learning effects in exploiting electronic integra-
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS tion opportunities and capabilities. This is because of the
effort required in shifting an organization deeply rooted in
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis. Three one type of business process towards one that involves
important patterns emerge from this table. The interfaced radical shifts in the processes. Since we have not explored
group had consistently better performance levels befoiv nor measured this issue in any detail to conclude organiza-
integration (along all of the four criteria) than the non- tional learning effects, we note it as an interesting and
interfaced group (all the t-values are significant at p <.01). important issue worthy of further research attention and
This is largely attributed to the fact that the carrier we are exploring longitudinal designs with complementary
obviously selected its better-performing agents for electro- primary data from the agents on their process changes.
nic integration and thus a true experimental design would
not have been possible. This further reinforces the need
to assess percentage changes in the two groups rather than 4.2 Synthesis
absolute differences.
The aim of this study was to assess the collective perfor-
The interfaced group continued to report consistently mance of a set of agents that are electronically interfaced
better performance levels after integration (along all of against a corresponding group that is not interfaced
the four criteria) than the non-interfaced group (all the t- electronically with a focal carrier. The results provide
values are significant at levels better than p <.01). Thus, modest support for performance increase along some
a posttest-only design would have been of limited value. dimensions (e.g., new business policies for the six-month
window), but the overall performance effects are not very
The third pattern, however, is particularly striking. The strong. Further, while new policies are an important
differences in performance levels are generally not element of the insurance business, it is equally important
statistically different from the non-interfaced (control) to focus on the quality of the insurance sold by these
group. Indeed, only two of the t-values are significant, agents. For this purpose, it is critical to also assess
albeit marginally, at p <.10 and both relate to e#icieng, performance of loss-ratios, especially in those cases where
-- namely, increase in the number of policies. Both electronic integration also involved the decentralization of
measures of financial performance, written premium and underwriting authority to the agents. This requires a
commissions, did not differ between the two groups. complementary, focused analysis at the level of the agent
(which is being carried out).
4.1 The Question or Learning Effects 43 Research Implications
At this stage, there exists an obvious question of learning The major implication is that there is a critical need to
effects: Is it possible that the performance improvements systematically study the theoretical propositions on the role
were not observed within a six-month period after integra- and effects of electronic integration that have been recently
lion due to the internal process transformation that may be offered (Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987; Rotemberg
necessary to fully exploit the capabilities offered by and Saloner 1989). Towards this end, this study has made
integration? Adequate prior support exists for arguing that a modest attempt in designing and executing a field
the effects of technology are not instantaneous and that experiment. We believe that this is valuable for addressing
organizations need to transform their internal processes to the research questions in this area. However, researchers
fully exploit IT capabilities (Rockart and Short 1989). should examine other designs (presented in Figure 1) to -
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Table 1. Performance Effects of Electronic Integration
Monthly Averages ($000)
Cover six month period)
Performance Interface (n=85) Non-Interface (n=75) T-Test
Indicator Mean Sd Mean Sd Difference
Total Written Premium (Before) 166.5 255.2 74.5 59.8 3.25***
Total Written Premium (After) 201.2 411.8 70.2 68.4 2.99***
Change (%) in Total Premium 1 26.9 75.0 105.7 456.8 -1.34
Change (%) in Total Premium
(log transformed) 2 4.65 0.66 4.61 0.99 0.31
No. of Policies in Force (Before) 302.3 596.9 116.3 85.6 2.87***
No. of Policies in Force (After) 322.8 679.1 106.2 78.6 3.09***
, Change (%) in No. of Policies in Force 14.7 40.1 6.2 34.1 1.46
Change (%) in No. of Policies in Force
(log transformed) 4.70 0.25 4.63 0.26 1.95**
Commisions (Before) 25.1 49.0 10.3 8.3 2.76***
Commisions (After) 30.4 74.9 9.4 9.2 2.65***
Change (%) in Commisions 25.6 73.9 88.8 397.2 -1.27
Change (%) in Commisions
(log transformed) 4.65 0.62 4.62 0.92 0.27
New Business Policies (Before) 7.8 9.3 3.8 3.4 3.70***
New Business Policies (After) 9.1 14.2 2.8 2.0 4.12***
Change (%) in New Business Policies 14.8 76.6 25.7 178.2 -0.45
Change (%) in New Business Policies
(log transformed) 4.59 0.53 4.39 0.85 1.63*
***pS .01 **pg .05 *PS .1
1 Change is calculated as (after-before)*100/before for each agent and then mean values
reported for the entire sample.
2 Due to high skewness in the distributions, log tranformations provide more appropriate
comparisons of percentage changes.
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complement the richness of in-depth case studies. Such Bonoma, T. V. "Case Research in Marketing: Oppor-
a move would ensure that our prescriptions for electronic tunities, Problems and a Process." Journal ofMarketing
integration have not only theoretical validity but also Research, Number 22, 1985, pp. 199-208.
empirical support.
Blois, K. J. "Vertical Quasi-Integration." Journal of
For this specific research, the implication is that this Industnal Economics, Number 20, 1972, pp. 253-272.
broad-brush design should be complemented by a study
that focuses at the level of the interfaced agent. Such a Business Week. "Information Processing." September 8,
study would shed light on the determinants of variance in 1980, p. 73.
performance within this set of agents, given that electronic
integration alone does not determine agents' performance. Business Week. "Information Business." August 25, 1986,
The role of organizationaltransformation in fullyexploiting pp. 82-90.
the benefits of electronic integration should also be
considered . Business Week. "Information Power." October 14,1985.
Finally, it is fashionable to call for longitudinal designs in Cameron, K., and Whetten, D. "Organizational Effective-
virtually any stream of research, but this study provided ness: One Model or Several?" In K. S. Cameron and D.
some support for its use in this area. The possibility of A. Whetten, Editors, O,ganizational EUectiveness: A
learning and the larger question of sustainability of benefits Comparison of Multiple Perspectives. New York:
underscores the usefulness of longitudinal designs. Academic Press, 1983, pp. 1-24.
Cash, J. I., and Konsynski, B. "IS Redraws Competitive
5. CONCLUSIONS Boundaries." Han'ard Business Review, Volume 63,
Number 2, 1985, pp. 134-142.
This study focused on the effects of electronic integration
(through proprietary standards) of one major carrier with Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. "McKesson Drug Company:
a set of independent agents. The effects of electronic A Case Study of Economost -- A Strategic Information
integration were assessed from the perspective of the focal System: Journal of Management Information Systems,
carrier in terms of the degree ofincteases in pe,fonnance Summer 1988, Volume 5, Number 1.
reported by a sample of interfaced agents as compared to
a matched set of non-interfaced agents. The results Cook, T. D., and Campbell, D. T. Quasi-Experimenta-
(especially the non-parametric test results) indicate modest tion: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings,
support for the hypothesis of performance effects due to Houghton Mifflin, 1979.
integration. In addition, there seems to be an interesting
"learning" effect, since agents interfaced for a year show Copeland, D. G., and McKenney, J. L. "Airline Reserva-
significant increases in performance over corresponding tion Systems: Lessons from History." MIS Quarterly,
agents not interfaced with difference absent at the six- September 1988, pp. 353-370.
month mark.
d'Adolf, S. V. "Its a Smaller Agency World." I,idependent
Agent, August 1987.
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